The death of Moneyball, as a film and an idea?

Some interesting news came out this evening. Apparently, Columbia Pictures decided to cancel [Will Brinson, FanHouse] the upcoming movie of Michael Lewis' famed book Moneyball at the last minute, only a few days before shooting was set to start. It's rare to see that kind of cancellation so close to production on any film, but even more unusual when it's a big-ticket film involving the likes of Brad Pitt and director Steven Soderbergh. Apparently, the studio didn't like the direction Soderbergh was taking the project. There's a chance the film could still get picked up by someone else; we'll have to wait and see on that front.


This is a somewhat unfortunate move in my mind. Moneyball was a brilliant book, and one that truly revolutionized how many segments of people—from print journalists to television personalities to fans, bloggers, and even team executives—approached baseball. Its influence spread beyond baseball to other leagues, and it dramatically changed the sporting landscape. It encouraged unconventional thinking and analysis and played a key role in popularizing the sabermetrics movement. It's the main reason I labelled Lewis as the Elvis of the sports world a while back, and he fits the moniker much better than even Bill Simmons' candidate, Houston Rockets' general manager Daryl Morey. I wasn't sure that Moneyball would translate to the big screen all that well, but it would have been interesting to see in any case. There certainly aren't many sports movies being made these days, either, so losing one of the few high-profile ones known to be in development isn't a good sign for the sports film scene.

It's also somewhat apt, though. The film's currently in limbo. Its future with Columbia appears dead, but there may be other studios interested in giving it new life. In my mind, that same process has happened with Moneyball as a whole. At its heart, Moneyball described how Oakland Athletics general manager Billy Beane and his staff couldn't afford to compete with the clubs with bigger budgets for the top free agents, so they had to find another way to win. They did so by spotting players who were productive, but undervalued, most notably players with relatively low batting averages and relatively high on-base percentages, and then acquiring those players cheaply.It's simple economics; if there's a limited supply of traditionally valued players and a significant demand, they'll be expensive, but if you can find players with close to as much value and lower demand for their services, you can achieve similar results.

Beane and his staff did very well with this philosophy, winning 90 or more games every year from 2000 to 2004 and 80 or more games from 1999 (the year after Beane succeeded Sandy Alderson as the A's full general manager) to 2006, despite minuscule payrolls, a lack of high draft picks and not many players traditionally thought of as top-end talent. Some have used the A's lack of playoff success during that period (they lost in the first round four times and in the American League Championship Series once) as a knock on the Moneyball approach, but that criticism is flawed; just making the playoffs in baseball is tough enough, for one thing, and short playoff series have a small enough sample size that even far better teams will still lose quite a lot of the time (as David Berri explains wonderfully here). In short, the Moneyball approach worked very well for the A's from 1999 to 2006.

Since then, however, things have gone downhill for Oakland. They suffered through losing seasons in 2007 and 2008, and appear likely to have another one this year. That's not an indictment of Beane, as he's still doing quite well with limited resources and the team has suffered its fair share of injuries and free agency departures over that period as well (see Swisher, Nick, a first-round draft pick covered in Moneyball who had significant success
with the A's, but left for the White Sox in 2008 and is now with the Yankees). It is a reflection that the Moneyball strategy no longer works in the form it once did.

It goes back to simple economics again. As the most basic example, before Moneyball came out in 2003, there was a significant supply of the high on-base percentage, lower batting average players favoured by Beane's approach and relatively little demand for them. After Moneyball, almost everyone from fans to team executives realized that these guys were worth more than they thought. Several guys with a background on the statistics side got jobs as major-league general managers (including Beane assistant J.P. Ricciardi, now the general manager of the Toronto Blue Jays), with many more being hired as assistant general managers and consultants; most of them quickly started adopting some of the strategies that had worked well for Beane. Even executives who don't seem to place a high value on OBP in practice give it at least lip service (see Moore, Dayton, who Joe Posnanski comments on here), resulting in significantly more demand for these kind of players. This increased demand means these players achieve a market value more suited to their skills, and thus can no longer be acquired cheaply. When everyone's doing it, it isn't an unconventional strategy any more. Thus, the idea of Moneyball along the specific terms expressed in the book is largely dead; the OBP approach in particular still has plenty of value and is a good idea for many teams, but it's no longer really a cheap way to win.

However, the larger idea behind Moneyball is very much alive and ticking despite the claims of some curmudgeons. The book's central thesis was that you can build an effective professional sports franchise cheaply by finding and exploiting market deficiencies, and that's still very true. In baseball, one way we've seen this lately is in teams' evaluations of players' defensive prowess, which used to be largely based on eyesight and spectacular, highlight-reel plays. Defensive statistics still have a way to go, but such statistics as Michael Lichtman's Ultimate Zone Rating (fully explained here, explained more simply here) and John Dewan's +/- system (explained here) allowed for a more detailed evaluation of players' fielding performances and gave some teams that picked up on them early the chance to sweep up undervalued defenders. I'm sure Beane and his fellow unconventional thinkers have plenty of other ideas in the works as well.

In hockey, guys like Vancouver Canucks general manager Mike Gillis have tried to apply a similar "Moneypuck" strategy for finding underrated players and have discussed in detail [Iain McIntyre, Vancouver Sun] how Beane inspired them, plus there's been a surge in new statistical analysis as exemplified by such sites as Gabriel Desjardins' Behind The Net. Basketball's also witnessed a statistical revolution and an increased application of unconventional insight, led by the likes of John Hollinger and the aforementioned David Berri. Even Lewis got in on the act this year with a tremendous piece on the Rockets' Shane Battier.

Statistical analysis have taken on a large role in football as well, as shown by the work of writers like KC Joyner (who I interviewed here) and Aaron Schatz; I still argue that there's room for much more unconventional thinking in the sport, though. Lewis also discussed some of the historical changes in the game wrought by unconventional analysis in his book The Blind Side (a few of which I analyzed over at The Good Point), which has already been made into a film scheduled to be released later this year.

These, and the numerous other examples out there, demonstrate that large numbers of people have caught on to the basic idea of exploiting market deficiencies to build a successful franchise. They'll likely take it in many different ways, and only some of them will pan out. However, this is proof that the principles behind Lewis' book linger on despite the specific examples perhaps petering out. Like the film, reports of the death of the ideas behind the book may have been greatly exaggerated, to borrow a phrase from Mark Twain. Moneyball is dead: long live Moneyball!

On The Ground: Jason Brewer on the Eagles' tackles

In the last part of my interview series for this piece on left tackles at The Good Point, I present my full interview with Jason Brewer, who covers the Philadelphia Eagles for the excellent SB Nation blog Bleeding Green Nation. My previous interviews with KC Joyner and Bruce Raffel can be found here and here. Hope you've enjoyed this series!

Andrew Bucholtz: What do you see the left tackle's role as in today's NFL: mostly pass protection, mostly run-blocking or a combination of the two? How would you evaluate a left tackle's importance as compared to the rest of the offensive linemen? Also, do you think this role's changed over the last decade, and if so, how so?

Jason Brewer: I think that's entirely dependent on the team he's on. We all know that some teams, like the Eagles, pass more than others. However, I would say that primarily the role of a LT is be a great pass protector. The biggest reason the guy playing on the left is more important than the guy on the right is that he's protecting the blind side of a right-handed QB. So the ability to pass block is that much more important for a LT than most other positions along the line, whereas the ability to run block is no more important for a LT specifically than any of the other OL positions.

A.B.: In your mind, how important is it for a team to have a good left tackle? Can you win without one?

J.B.: I think it's just about imperative to have a good LT on a winning team. Any time an opposing team can pressure the passer, the likelihood of turnovers goes up. When a team can pressure the passer from his blindside, turnovers are even more likely. We all know that moment that makes you cringe... When your QB is looking downfield, you can plainly see that DE coming unblocked at his blind side, and he doesn't know the guy is there. How many times that does end up in a strip sack or the QB getting hammered and fumbling? Often. So having a guy that prevent a game changing turnover like that with consistency is incredibly important.

A.B.: Are left tackles worth the amount of money they're paid?

J.B.: That's an interesting question. Actually, the gap between what elite LTs make and what other guys along the line make is getting a little smaller. We've seen guards get some big paydays in recent years, but the LTs are still making the mind-boggling bucks. I guess if you've spent $100 million on a franchise QB, it's worth it to spend around half that to make sure his back side is protected.

A.B.: What are the most important characteristics for a good left tackle in your mind?

J.B.: Probably footwork. These guys are facing the elite pass rusher on the opposing team week in and week out. They face bigger 4-3 DEs and speedy 3-4 OLBs. Only the ability to move your feet and adjust your center of gravity quickly is going to give you a chance to block those guys consistently.

A.B: If you were appointed as the GM of an NFL expansion franchise and had to create a roster from scratch via an expansion draft, a regular draft and free agency, where would acquiring a left tackle fit in your priorities? Would you try and grab him through one of the drafts or through free agency?

J.B.: I'd probably rank LT as my #3 priority. Franchise QB comes first, then an elite pass rusher, then the LT. I guess I'd probably rather draft one than spend the $60 or $70 mil needed to sign one on the free agent market.

A.B. Your posts I've seen on the Jason Peters trade seem fairly positive. What do you think he'll bring to the Eagles? Will he be worth all the picks the team gave up?


J.B.: Well, the amount of picks is really not all that great. There was a late first, a 4th, and then, I believe, a sixth-rounder in 2010. For a two-time Pro Bowl LT who's only 27, that's fairly cheap in my opinion. It's far less than the Eagles would probably have had to give up in order to move up in the draft for one of the two "elite" LT prospects.

I'm optimistic about Peters. He has the athleticism to do the kind of things the Eagles ask of their offensive linemen. I think now that he's properly motivated and got the money he was after, he should return to that devastating form of 2007 that made the league sit up and take notice of him.

Thanks to Jason for taking the time to answer my questions. Check out his blog here!

On The Ground: KC Joyner on the importance of the left tackle

For the last couple of weeks, I've been working on a piece for The Good Point about the importance of the left tackle in the NFL, particularly concerning the different views espoused by Michael Lewis and KC Joyner. I finished it up this morning, and editor extraordinaire Austin Kent already has it posted, so you can check it out here. It features interviews with Joyner, a famed author who also writes for ESPN and The New York Times, Brian Galliford of Buffalo Rumblings, Jason Brewer of Bleeding Green Nation and Bruce Raffel of Baltimore Beatdown.

As with my previous piece for The Good Point, I got a lot of interesting information that I wasn't able to fit into the piece, so I've decided to again present extended interviews as part of my ongoing On The Ground interview series. I'll present my full interview with Joyner today, with Raffel's to come Wednesday and Brewer's on Friday. Almost of Galliford's quotes made it into the piece, so there isn't much point in posting a separate interview with him. Here's my conversation with Joyner about his 2008 book Blindsided: Why the Left Tackle is Overrated and Other Contrarian Football Thoughts and his thoughts in general on left tackles. Thanks to KC for taking the time to answer my questions. You can check out his website here and pre-order his new book, Scientific Football 2009, right here.

Andrew Bucholtz: In Blindsided, you wrote that “Today’s defenses don’t rely as much on getting the edge linebacker in a one-on-one matchup against a left tackle, but instead try to get a matchup anywhere they can on the line. That makes building a solid offensive line across the board much more important than just having one great left tackle.” Why do you think defenses have changed their approach to pass rushing? Have left tackles become better, are there less great blind side pass rushers, or is it just a more complicated approach to defensive game plans?

KC Joyner: It all comes down to the idea that there are two ways to approach attacking offenses - you can either attack the scheme or attack personnel weaknesses.

The gist of attacking a scheme is to find a set/formation weakness and that normally involves trying to get more rushers than blockers at a given area. In that case, it doesn't matter how good the LT is because you are going to occupy him with a rusher and get someone unblocked around him.

If a team is more personnel than scheme oriented, they are going to try to find the weakest link on the line and go after that player. Again, if the LT is strong and there is a weaker link on the line, this type of team will go after the weaker player and thus avoid the LT.

I also don't think teams have necessarily changed the way they approach things. Bill Walsh loved to talk about how he made the left tackle position so important but it is also worth pointing out that his first Super Bowl win came with a guard playing LT and his second came with a fat, underachieving LT (Bubba Paris). If the LT position was so important, how was it that Walsh put up two championship wins with a subpar player at that position? The answer, in my estimation, is that it isn't as important as he said it was but he wanted to make the case about Harris Barton's value to help promote himself as a football genius. I'm not saying he wasn't a genius but he had a lot of Carl Sagan in him - his brilliance was obvious but so was his penchant for self-promotion.

A.B.: One of the points Lewis seems to be making in The Blind Side is that good left tackles are highly valued because of the unusual mix of attributes required to excel at the position (tremendous size and great speed). What do you think of that idea? If he has a point there, would it be reasonable for left tackles to still be drafted higher and paid more than guards or centers due to their scarcity even if their role isn’t actually much more important? Also, is there a significant difference in the skills needed to play left tackle and right tackle?

K.J.: I believe one justifiable reason for a team to pursue the size/speed attributes for the left tackle position is because that is the position where those traits can have the greatest value in pass blocking. Guards and centers need size and a certain amount of speed, but they are not going to be tested at the corner the way that left tackles are. Another way to put it is that there is a limited amount of pass blocking upside potential for guards and centers because of the nature of their position. Right tackles are also in a similar boat because the tight end typically lines up on their side. Teams will always pay big dollars for upside physical potential and since the left tackle spot has more of that than the other line spots, it will tend to draw more financial interest.

A.B.: There were four tackles chosen in the first round of the draft this year: Jason Smith (2nd overall), Andre Smith (6th), Eugene Monroe (8th) and Michael Oher (23rd). By contrast, there were no guards picked in the first round and only two centers (Alex Mack and Eric Wood, 21st and 28th overall). Do you think this shows teams are placing too much importance on the left tackle, or is there something else involved?

K.J.: Again, I'd say it is a play for the upside potential but from the center position standpoint, it also had to do with free agency. The Dolphins, Rams, Ravens and Raiders all needed help at that position and addressed their needs via free agency. Had that not been the case, it is possible the center position may have seen more interest this year.

A.B.: Say you’re the GM of an expansion franchise and you have to build an NFL roster from scratch via an expansion draft, a regular draft and free agency. Where does acquiring a good left tackle fit into your priorities, and which route (expansion draft, regular draft or free agency) is the best way to get a good LT?

K.J.: You have to build a team around the type of coach you have. In a generic sense, however, I'd say you have to go QB first and then go for CBs and pass rushers. It is a passing league and if you don't have someone to throw the ball and/or defend the pass, you aren't going to get far in today's NFL.

A.B.: Your Blindsided comparison of Orlando Pace and L.J. Shelton’s similar numbers was quite interesting. Do you think this means that tackle play in the passing game shouldn’t be evaluated strictly on sacks allowed? If so, what is the best way to evaluate tackle pass protection?

K.J.: I think the best way to evaluate any pass protection is to a) measure all positive and negative plays the tackle makes and b) put it in context. A left tackle for a team like Buffalo that only threw around 150 vertical passes last year should allow fewer sacks than a left tackle for the Broncos who threw around 240 vertical passes.

A.B.: In a Fifth Down post in December, you wrote that you were surprised to see Jason Peters earn a Pro Bowl nod given his pass-blocking and run-blocking numbers. Who do you think got the better deal in his trade to the Eagles?

K.J.: At first I thought the Eagles might have made a mistake in the Peters deal because he gave up 11.5 sacks last year. After tabulating his run blocking totals (which included a terrific 90.1% Point of Attack block win percentage), I think the Eagles made a very good move, especially since I believe they are going to start leaning on the run game a bit more this year.

A.B.: Who would you pick as the best left tackle in the game at the moment?

K.J.: I'm still in the midst of the 2008 tape reviews but from where I'm at right now, I'd say Jake Long. He allowed only 2 sacks and had a POA win percentage of just under 90%.

A.B.: At the end of the Blindsided chapter on the left tackle, you wrote that you hoped your work would be just the first of many studies on the subject. Obviously, you’ve done a lot of studies since then for Scientific Football 2009 and other works, and others have also looked at the importance of the left tackle since then. Have your views on the position’s importance changed since you wrote Blindsided, or has further data backed your initial conclusions?

K.J.: As it stands at the moment, I'm of the same mindset. I'll be addressing this in SF 2009 with an article about the left tackle position and how the crop of highly touted young left tackles probably aren't as good as the hype says they are. They may get there eventually but for more than a couple of them the hype is entirely undeserved.

Thanks again to KC for taking the time to answer my questions. Some fascinating stuff from him there. I highly recommend his books and ESPN/New York Times writing to anyone looking for a deeper look at the NFL.